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Abstract. The space of finite games can be decomposed into three orthogonal subspaces [5], which are the
subspaces of pure potential games, nonstrategic games and pure harmonic games. The orthogonal projections
onto these subspaces are represented as the Moore-Penrose inverses of the corresponding linear operators (i.e.,
matrices) [5]. Although the representation is compact and nice, no analytic method is given to calculate Moore-
Penrose inverses of these linear operators. Hence using their results, one cannot verify whether a finite game
belongs to one of these subspaces. In this paper, jumping over calculating Moore-Penrose inverses of these linear
operators directly, via using group inverses, in the framework of the semitensor product of matrices, we give
explicit polynomial representation for these orthogonal projections and for potential functions of potential games.
Using our results, one not only can determine whether a finite game belongs to one of these subspaces, but also
can find an arbitrary finite game belonging to one of them. Besides, we give formal definitions for these types of
games by using their payoff functions. Based on these results, more properties of finite games are revealed.
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1 Introduction
Rosenthal [2] initiates the concept of potential games, and proves that every potential game has a pure Nash
equilibrium. Monderer and Shapley [6] systematically investigate potential games, give a method to verify whether
a given game is potential, and prove that every potential game is isomorphic to a congestion game. Intuitively
speaking, a potential game is a game with a function from the set of strategy profiles to the reals satisfying that, the
deviation of every player’s payoff caused by the deviation of this player’s strategies is equal to that of the function
also caused by the deviation of this player’s strategies. Partially due to the fact that there is one common function
describing the deviation of every player’s payoff, potential games have been applied to many fields, e.g., traffic
networks [18, 17, 16], cooperative control [19], optimization of distributed coverage of graphs [20], etc..
Although potential games possess so good properties and wide applications, there are other types of games that
are not potential but still have good properties and potential applications. For example, the Rock-Paper-Scissors
game is not potential, but has the uniformly mixed strategy profile as a mixed Nash equilibrium [5]. Hence it is
necessary to give a systematic characterization for these finite games to investigate properties of other types of
games and find their practical applications. When the number of players and the numbers of their strategies are
*
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fixed, Candogan et al. [5] identify the set of finite games with a finite-dimensional Euclidean space, and decompose
this space into three orthogonal subspaces as follows:
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Potential games
P ⊕
Harmonic games︷ ︸︸ ︷
N ⊕ H , (1)
where these subspaces are (i) the pure potential subspace P , (ii) the nonstrategic subspace N , and (iii) the pure
harmonic subspaceH. It is also demonstrated in [5] that the pure potential subspace plus the nonstrategic subspace
is the potential subspace, denoted as GP = P⊕N ; and the pure harmonic subspace plus the nonstrategic subspace
is the harmonic subspace, denoted as GH = H ⊕N . Nonstrategic games are such that every strategy profile is a
pure Nash equilibirium. Harmonic games generically do not have pure Nash equilibria, but always have the uni-
formly mixed strategy profiles as mixed Nash equilibria. Actually Candogan et al. [5] show orthogonal projections
onto these subspaces by using the Moore-Penrose inverses of the corresponding linear operators (i.e., matrices).
Although these orthogonal projections are very compact and nice, one cannot use them to verify whether a finite
game belongs to one of these subspaces, because it is not shown how to calculate the Moore-Penrose inverses of
these linear operators in [5]. It is well known that Moore-Penrose inverses of matrices can be represented via singu-
lar value decompositions of matrices (details are seen in Subsection 2.3), and it is impossible to calculate singular
value decompositions of matrices analytically. Although the corresponding matrices related to decomposition of
finite games have special structure, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no analytic method to calculate
their singular value decompositions. Hence it is very difficult to obtain explicit forms of these orthogonal projec-
tions. It is important to obtain explicit forms of these projections, because if they were obtained, one could verify
whether a given finite game belongs to one of these subspaces, and furthermore, one could find an arbitrary finite
game belonging to one of these subspaces. Hence explicit forms are very important for further study on properties
of games belong to these subspaces. In this paper, we not only show how to calculate these orthogonal projections,
but also give closed (actually polynomial) forms for them. Using these results, one not only can verify whether a
finite game belongs to one of these subspaces, but also can construct an arbitrary game belonging to one of these
subspaces (Theorem 5.6). The advantage of Theorem 5.6 is that it shows formulae for these orthogonal projections
as functions of the number of players and those of their strategies. Hence no matter whether the number of players
and those of their strategies are given, one knows what these orthogonal projections “look like”.
Our results are given in the framework of the semitensor product (STP) of matrices built by Cheng [15], in
which a linear equation (called potential equation) is proposed such that a finite game is potential iff the potential
equation has a solution; and it is also proved that if the potential equation has a solution, then the potential function
of the corresponding game can be calculated from any solution. In this paper, based on Theorem 5.6, we will
show a further result (Theorem 5.7), i.e., closed (actually polynomial) forms for both the solutions of potential
equations and the corresponding potential functions. Using our results, to testify whether a finite game is potential
and to calculate its potential function, one only needs to calculate the multiplication and addition of matrices only
depending on the number of players and those of their strategies. Specifically, when the number of players and
those of their strategies are given, we can show the orthogonal projectionPGP onto the subspace of potential games,
then every game u with the same number of players and those of their strategies is potential iff PGP u = u (details
are seen in Section 5). Note that PGP does not depend on u, but the potential equation depends on u [15]. So our
result is an essential improvement compared to [15]. The STP of matrices is for the first time proposed by Cheng
[12]. STP is a natural generalization of the conventional matrix product, and has been applied into many fields,
e.g., analysis and control of Boolean control networks [7, 8, 9, 10, 11], control-theoretic problems [12], symmetry
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of dynamical systems [13], differential geometry and Lie algebras [14], etc.. Basic knowledge on STP is shown in
Section 3.
The key tool that we use to obtain the polynomial representation of these orthogonal projections and potential
functions is group inverse. Moore-Penrose inverses and group inverses are both generalized inverses. Actually, the
main results of this paper are obtained from a result given in our previous paper [4]. Basic knowledge is seen in
Subsection 2.3.
The remainder parts of this paper are arranged as follows. Section 2 introduces necessary basic knowledge
on finite-dimensional Euclidean spaces, Moore-Penrose inverses and group inverses. Section 3 introduces nonco-
operative strategic form finite games and their vector space structure in the framework of STP. Section 4 shows
orthogonal projections onto subspaces of finite games based on Moore-Penrose inverses in the framework of STP.
Section 5 shows the main contribution of this paper, polynomial representation for these orthogonal projections
and for potential functions of potential games. Some examples are also shown to demonstrate the advantage of our
results. Section 6 ends up with some remar ks.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, necessary basic knowledge on Euclidean spaces, Moore-Penrose inverses and group inverses of
matrices are introduced. Notations are first shown as below.
2.1 Notations
• 2A: the power set of set A
• im(A) (resp. ker(A)): the image (resp. kernel) space of a matrix A
• R: the set of real numbers (the reals for short)
• Rm: the set of m-dimensional real column vector space
• Rm×n: the set of m× n real matrices
• In: the n× n identity matrix
• δin: the i-th column of the identity matrix In
• ∆n: the set of columns of In
• [1, p]: the first p positive integers
• AT : the transpose of matrix A
• 1k: (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
)T
• 1m×n (0m×n): the m× n matrix with all entries equal to 1 (0)
• |A|: the cardinality of set A
• A†: the Moore-Penrose inverse of matrix A
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• A♯: the group inverse of square matrix A
• Ckn: the binomial coefficient n!k!(n−k)!
• A1 ⊕A2 ⊕ · · · ⊕An:


A1 0 · · · 0
0 A2 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 · · · An


2.2 Euclidean spaces and orthogonality
In this paper, we consider the Euclidean space Rm with the conventional inner product: for all x, y ∈ Rm,
〈x, y〉 = xT y. Next we introduce some necessary preliminaries on orthogonality and projections. These results
can be found in many textbooks on matrix theory, e.g., [21]. Two vectors x, y ∈ Rm are called orthogonal, denoted
by x⊥y, if 〈x, y〉 = 0. Two subspaces A,B ⊂ Rm are called orthogonal, also denoted by A⊥B, if for all x ∈ A,
all y ∈ B, 〈x, y〉 = 0. The unique orthogonal component subspace of A is denoted by A⊥. An idempotent
symmetric matrix A ∈ Rm×m is called the orthogonal projection of Rm onto im(A). Note that if A ∈ Rm×m is
a projection (i.e., idempotent), then x ∈ im(A) iff x = Ax. The following helpful proposition will be used in the
main results.
Proposition 2.1 Given two orthogonal projections A1, A2 ∈ Rm×m. im(A1) = im(A2) iff A1 = A2.
Proof The “if” part holds obviously. Next we prove the “only if” part. For all x ∈ Rm, A1x ∈ im(A1) =
im(A2), then A2A1x = A1x. Hence A2A1 = A1. Symmetrically A1A2 = A2. Then A1 = AT1 = (A2A1)T =
AT1 A
T
2 = A1A2 = A2.
2.3 Moore-Penrose inverses and group inverses
In this subsection we introduce necessary basic knowledge on Moore-Penrose inverses and group inverses (two
types of generalized inverses of matrices). The following Propositions 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 over the complex field
can be found in [3]. Their current version over the real field can be proved similarly by using the singular value
decomposition of matrices over the real field. Their proofs are omitted.
For a matrix A ∈ Rm×n, a matrix X ∈ Rn×m satisfying AXA = A,XAX = X, (AX)T = AX, (XA)T =
XA is called the Moore-Penrose inverse of A, and is denoted by X = A†.
Proposition 2.2 A matrix A ∈ Rm×n has one and only one Moore-Penrose inverse.
Note that for any matrix A ∈ Rm×n with its singular value decomposition
A = U
[
diag(λ1, . . . , λr) 0
0 0
]
V T ,
where each λi is a positive singular value of A, U ∈ Rm×m and V ∈ Rn×n are both orthogonal matrices,
A† = V
[
diag(λ−11 , . . . , λ
−1
r ) 0
0 0
]
UT .
It is well known that it is impossible to calculate λi’s analytically, hence it is impossible to calculateA† analytically
based on the singular value decomposition.
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Proposition 2.3 For every matrix A ∈ Rm×n, Rm = im(A)⊕ ker(AT ) = im(AA†)⊕ im(Im −AA†), im(A) =
im(AAT ) = im(AA†), ker(AT ) = ker(AAT ) = im(Im − AA†), AA† (resp. Im − AA†) is the orthogonal
projection of Rm onto im(A) (resp. ker(AT )).
For a matrix A ∈ Rn×n, a matrix X ∈ Rn×n satisfying AXA = A,XAX = X,AX = XA is called the
group inverse of A, and is denoted by X = A♯.
Proposition 2.4 A matrix A ∈ Rn×n has at most one group inverse, and A has a group inverse iff rank(A) =
rank(A2). If A has a group inverse A♯, then A♯ is a polynomial of A.
By Proposition 2.4, every symmetric square real matrix has a group inverse. By Proposition 2.3, for every
matrix A ∈ Rm×n, AAT (AAT )♯ is the orthogonal projection of Rm onto im(A), because (AAT )♯ = (AAT )†.
Then the following Proposition 2.5 holds.
Proposition 2.5 For every matrix A ∈ Rm×n, AA† = AAT (AAT )♯ = A(ATA)♯AT .
Proposition 2.6 is a special case of our previous result [4, Theorem 4.1], and is a central proposition that leads
to the main results of the current paper.
Proposition 2.6 ([4]) A matrixA ∈ Rn×n has a group inverse iff there is a matrixX ∈ Rn×n such thatA2X = A.
If A has a group inverse, then for every X satisfying A2X = A, A♯ = AX2.
The following Proposition 2.7 will also play an important role in the main results.
Proposition 2.7 Let A ∈ Rp×q and B ∈ Rp×r and im(A) ⊃ im(B). Then BB†AA† = AA†BB† = BB†.
Proof Note that BB† (resp. AA†) is an orthogonal projection of Rp onto im(B) (resp. im(A)).
For an arbitrary x ∈ Rp, BB†x ∈ im(B) ⊂ im(A), then AA†(BB†x) = BB†x. Hence AA†BB† =
BB†. On the other hand, from the definition of Moore-Penrose inverses, BB† = (BB†)T = (AA†BB†)T =
(BB†)T (AA†)T = BB†AA†.
3 Finite games and the semitensor product of matrices
A noncooperative strategic form finite game can be described as a triple (N,S, c), where
1. N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players;
2. Si = {1, . . . , ki} is the set of strategies of player i, i = 1, . . . , n; S =
∏n
i=1 S
i is the set of strategy profiles;
3. c = {c1, c2, . . . , cn}, where ci : S → R is the payoff function of player i, i = 1, . . . , n.
Hereinafter S−i denotes
∏n
j=1,j 6=i S
j
, and similarly for a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S, s−i denotes
(s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn).
A pure Nash equilibrium (cf. [6], etc.) is a strategy profile (s∗1, . . . , s∗n) ∈ S such that for all i ∈ N , all
si ∈ Si, ci(s∗1, . . . , s
∗
i−1, si, s
∗
i+1, . . . , s
∗
n) ≤ ci(s
∗
1, . . . , s
∗
n). That is, if the players play a pure Nash equilibrium,
none of the players will improve their payoffs if only one player changes his/her strategy. Note that a finite game
(N,S, c) may have no pure Nash equilibria. However, if mixed strategies are considered, every finite game has
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a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium [1]. As usual, for each player i ∈ N , a mixed strategy xi is a probability
distribution Si → R, i.e., for all s ∈ Si, xi(s) ≥ 0 and
∑
s∈Si xi(s) = 1, which means that player i plays
strategy s with probability xi(s). For each i ∈ N , the set of mixed strategies is denoted by ∆Si. Then the
product probability distribution is
∏n
i=1 ∆S
i
. In particular, a mixed strategy profile (x∗1, . . . , x∗n) ∈
∏n
i=1∆S
i is
called uniformly mixed strategy profile, if for all i ∈ N , all s ∈ Si, x∗i (s) = 1ki . Under the product probability
distribution, payoffs ci of players i ∈ N are naturally extended to the expected payoffs over all pure strategy
profiles c∗i :
∏n
j=1 ∆S
j → R, x = (x1, . . . , xn) 7→
∑
s∈S ci(s)x(s) =
∑
s∈S ci(s)
∏n
j=1 xj(s) that is linear
in each xi. Hereinafter we will use ci to denote c∗i since no confusion will occur. A mixed Nash equilibrium is
a mixed strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x∗n) ∈
∏n
i=1 ∆S
i such that for all players i ∈ N , all mixed strategies
xi ∈ ∆Si, ci(x∗) ≥ ci(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
i−1, xi, x
∗
i+1, . . . , x
∗
n). Note that x∗ ∈
∏n
i=1∆S
i is a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium iff, for all players i ∈ N , all pure strategies si ∈ Si, ci(x∗) ≥ ci(x∗1, . . . , x∗i−1, si, x∗i+1, . . . , x∗n).
Next we introduce the vector space structure of finite games based on the STP of matrices built in [15]. In this
framework, mixed strategies and mixed strategy profiles can be represented as real vectors, hence payoffs can be
represented as linear mapping forms. Then all properties of finite games can be revealed intuitively from matrices.
Definition 1 [7] Let A ∈ Rm×n, B ∈ Rp×q, and α = lcm(n, p) be the least common multiple of n and p. The
STP of A and B is defined as
A⋉B = (A⊗ Iα
n
)(B ⊗ Iα
p
),
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product.
The STP of matrices is a generalization of conventional matrix product, and many properties of the conventional
matrix product remain valid, e.g., associative law, distributive law, reverse-order law ((A⋉B)T = BT ⋉AT ), etc..
Besides, for all x ∈ Rt and A ∈ Rm×n, it holds that x⋉A = (It⊗A)x. Throughout this paper, the default matrix
product is STP, so the product of two arbitrary matrices is well defined, and the symbol⋉ is usually omitted.
To use matrix expression to games, we identify
j ∼ δjki , j = 1, . . . , ki,
then Si ∼ ∆ki , i = 1, . . . , n. It follows that the payoff functions can be expressed as
ci(x1, . . . , xn) = V
c
i ⋉
n
j=1 xj , i = 1, . . . , n, (2)
where (V ci )T ∈ Rk is called the structure vector of ci, xj ∈ ∆kj , j = 1, . . . , n, hereinafter k :=
∏n
i=1 ki. Define
the structure vector of a game G by
(V cG)
T = (V c1 , V
c
2 , . . . , V
c
n )
T ∈ Rnk. (3)
Then it is clear that the set of strategic form finite games with |N | = n, and |Si| = ki, i = 1, . . . , n, denoted by
G[n;k1,...,kn], has a natural vector space structure as
G[n;k1,...,kn] ∼ R
nk. (4)
For a given game G ∈ G[n;k1,...,kn], its structure vector V cG completely determines G. So the vector space structure
(4) is very natural and reasonable.
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Remark 3.1 Consider the Euclidean space Rnk with the weighted inner product: for all x, y ∈ Rnk, 〈x, y〉 =
xTQy, where Q ∈ Rnk×nk is a positive definite symmetric matrix. Then for a linear operator (i.e., a matrix in
Rnk×p) A : Rnk → Rp, the orthogonal projection onto im(A) is A(ATQA)♯ATQ. In this paper, we consider the
convetional inner product, that is, the case that Q = Ink . While the inner product considered in [5] is with
Q = diag

k1, . . . , k1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, k2, . . . , k2︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, . . . , kn, . . . , kn︸ ︷︷ ︸
k

 .
Hence the (pure) harmonic games considered in this paper are a little bit different from the ones considered in
[5]. Despite of this difference, we can still prove that Harmonic games of this paper also have the uniformly mixed
strategy profiles as mixed Nash equilibria.
4 Orthogonal projections onto subspaces of finite games
Based on the above preliminaries, we are ready to show the orthogonal projections onto subspaces of finite games
in the framework of STP.
4.1 Subspaces of nonstrategic games
Let us define some notations. Part of these notations for the first time appear in [15].
Define
k[p,q] :=
{ ∏q
j=p kj , if q ≥ p,
1, if q < p,
(5)
Ei :=Ik[1,i−1] ⊗ 1ki ⊗ Ik[i+1,n] ∈ Rk× k
ki
,
ei :=EiE
T
i = Ik[1,i−1] ⊗ 1ki×ki ⊗ Ik[i+1,n] ∈ Rk×k,
i ∈ [1, n].
(6)
It is easy to verify the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 For all i ∈ [1, n],
E†i =
1
ki
ETi , EiE
†
i =
1
ki
ei. (7)
Define
BN := E1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ En ∈ R(nk)×(
∑
n
i=1
k
ki
), (8)
then the following proposition holds.
Proposition 4.2
B†N = E
†
1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ E
†
n, BNB
†
N =
1
k1
e1 ⊕ · · · ⊕
1
kn
en. (9)
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It follows directly that each Ei is of full column rank, hence so is BN , i.e.,
rank(BN ) =
n∑
i=1
k
ki
. (10)
From the results in [5], nonstrategic games are exactly the games such that the payoff of each player does not
depend on the strategy played by the player himself/herself. Then their formal definition is obtained as below.
Theorem 4.3 The nonstrategic games are exactly the games (N,S, c) in G[n;k1,...,kn] satisfying that
∀i ∈ [1, n], ∀y ∈ Si, ∀s ∈ S−i,
1
ki
∑
x∈Si
ci(x, s)− ci(y, s) = 0.
(11)
In the framework of STP, Theorem 4.3 can be represented as the following Theorem 4.4.
Theorem 4.4 Consider the finite game space G[n;k1,...,kn]. The nonstrategic subspace is
N = im(BN ) = im(E1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ En)
= im(BNB
†
N ) = im(E1E
†
1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ EnE
†
n)
= im
(
1
k1
e1 ⊕ · · · ⊕
1
kn
en
)
,
(12)
and satisfies
dim(N ) =
n∑
i=1
k
ki
. (13)
Proof By Propositions 2.3 and 4.2, we only need to prove N = im
(
1
k1
e1 ⊕ · · · ⊕
1
kn
en
)
. Then (13) nat-
urally holds by (10). It is easy to verify that for all i ∈ [1, n], 1
ki
ei are symmetric, and ( 1ki ei)
2 = 1
ki
ei, hence(
1
k1
e1 ⊕ · · · ⊕
1
kn
en
)
is an orthogonal projection.
Arbitrarily choose a game u = (u1, . . . , un)T ∈ G[n;k1,...,kn], where each uTi belongs to Rk. From (11), one
has u ∈ N iff, for all i ∈ [1, n], all X ∈ ∆k[1,i−1] , all y ∈ ∆ki , all Y ∈ ∆k[i+1,n] , 1ki
∑
z∈∆ki
uiXzY =
1
ki
uiX(
∑
z∈∆ki
z)Y = 1
ki
uiX1kiY =
1
ki
ui(X ⊗ 1ki ⊗ Y ) = uiXyY = ui(X ⊗ y ⊗ Y ) iff, for all i ∈ [1, n],
1
ki
ui(Ik[1,i−1] ⊗ 1ki×ki ⊗ Ik[i+1,n]) = ui
(
1
ki
ei
)
= ui(Ik[1,i−1] ⊗ Iki ⊗ Ik[i+1,n]) = ui iff, u ∈
im
(
1
k1
e1 ⊕ · · · ⊕
1
kn
en
)
. Hence N = im(BN ).
Next we characterize the projection of a game onto N . By Theorem 4.4, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 4.5 The projection of a game (N,S, c) ∈ G[n;k1,...,kn] onto the nonstrategic subspace N is (N,S, c′),
where c = {c1, . . . , cn}, c′ = {c′1, . . . , c′n}, for all i ∈ [1, n], all x ∈ Si, all y ∈ S−i, c′i(x, y) = 1ki
∑
z∈Si ci(z, y).
Proof Consider the vector form of game (N,S, c), i.e., uT = (u1, . . . , un)T ∈ Rnk, where each uTi belongs
to Rn. Then the projection of uT onto N , i.e., ( 1
k1
u1e1, . . . ,
1
kn
unen)
T satisfies that for all i ∈ [1, n], all X =
8
⋉nj=1Xj ∈ ∆k, X
[1,i−1] := ⋉i−1j=1Xj , X
[j+1,n] := ⋉nj=i+1Xj ,
1
ki
uieiX
=
1
ki
ui (Ik[1,i−1] ⊗ 1ki×ki ⊗ Ik[i+1,n])(
X [1,i−1] ⋉Xi ⋉X
[i+1,n]
)
=
1
ki
ui (Ik[1,i−1] ⊗ 1ki×ki ⊗ Ik[i+1,n])(
X [1,i−1] ⊗Xi ⊗X
[i+1,n]
)
=
1
ki
ui
((
Ik[1,i−1]X
[1,i−1]
)
⊗ (1ki×kiXi)⊗(
Ik[i+1,n]X
[i+1,n]
))
=
1
ki
ui
(
X [1,i−1] ⊗ 1ki ⊗X
[i+1,n]
)
=
1
ki
ui

X [1,i−1] ⋉

 ∑
z∈∆ki
z

⋉X [i+1,n]


=
1
ki
∑
z∈∆ki
ui
(
X [1,i−1] ⋉ z ⋉X [i+1,n]
)
.
(14)
That is, the conclusion holds.
4.2 Subspaces of potential games
In [6], potential games are defined as the games (N,S, c) in G[n;k1,...,kn] satisfying
∃φ : S → R, ∀i ∈ [1, n], ∀x, y ∈ Si, ∀z ∈ S−i,
ci(x, z)− ci(y, z) = φ(x, z)− φ(y, z),
(15)
where φ is called potential function.
From this definition, nonstrategic games are exactly the potential games that have constant potential functions.
For every nonstrategic game, every strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Necessary notations are given as follows. Regard 2[1,n] as an index set, for all Ns ⊂ [1, n],
eNs :=
{ ∏
i∈Ns
ei, if Ns 6= ∅,
Ik, otherwise.
(16)
Then
eNs = A1 ⊗A2 ⊗ · · · ⊗An, (17)
where
Ai =
{
Iki , if i /∈ Ns,
1ki×ki , if i ∈ Ns.
(18)
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Given a finite game (V cG)T = (V c1 , . . . , V cn )T ∈ Rnk, where each (V ci )T belongs to Rk, the corresponding
potential equation constructed in [15] is

−E1 E2 0 · · · 0
−E1 0 E3 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−E1 0 0 · · · En




ξ1
.
.
.
ξn

 =


(V c2 )
T − (V c1 )
T
.
.
.
(V cn )
T − (V c1 )
T

 , (19)
where E1, . . . , En are defined in (6), for each i ∈ [1, n], ξi ∈ R
k
ki . It is proved in [15] that game V cG is potential
iff Eqn. (19) has solution, and if Eqn. (19) has a solution ξ∗1 , . . . , ξ∗n, then V c1 − (ξ∗1 )TET1 is the structure vector of
a potential function of V cG.
Putting a free vector y ∈ Rk into Eqn. (19), Eqn. (19) is equivalent to

Ik 0 0 0 · · · 0
0 −E1 E2 0 · · · 0
0 −E1 0 E3 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 −E1 0 0 · · · En




y
ξ1
.
.
.
ξn

 =


y
(V c2 )
T − (V c1 )
T
.
.
.
(V cn )
T − (V c1 )
T

 , (20)
equivalent to 

Ik 0 0 0 · · · 0
Ik −E1 E2 0 · · · 0
Ik −E1 0 E3 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Ik −E1 0 0 · · · En




y
ξ1
.
.
.
ξn

 =


y
y + (V c2 )
T − (V c1 )
T
.
.
.
y + (V cn )
T − (V c1 )
T

 , (21)
and equivalent to 

Ik E1 0 0 · · · 0
Ik 0 E2 0 · · · 0
Ik 0 0 E3 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Ik 0 0 0 · · · En




y − E1ξ1
ξ1
.
.
.
ξn


=


y
y + (V c2 )
T − (V c1 )
T
.
.
.
y + (V cn )
T − (V c1 )
T

 .
(22)
Substituting y = (V c1 )T into Eqn. (22), one has

Ik E1 0 0 · · · 0
Ik 0 E2 0 · · · 0
Ik 0 0 E3 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Ik 0 0 0 · · · En




(V c1 )
T − E1ξ1
ξ1
.
.
.
ξn

 =


(V c1 )
T
(V c2 )
T
.
.
.
(V cn )
T

 , (23)
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hereinafter
BP :=


Ik E1 0 0 · · · 0
Ik 0 E2 0 · · · 0
Ik 0 0 E3 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Ik 0 0 0 · · · En

 ∈ R(nk)×(k+
∑
n
i=1
k
ki
). (24)
Then from Eqn. (23), a game V cG is potential iff (V cG)T belongs to im(BP ). [15, Lemma 22] shows that
rank


−E1 E2 0 · · · 0
−E1 0 E3 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−E1 0 0 · · · En

 =
∑n
i=1
k
ki
− 1. Then the following theorem holds.
Theorem 4.6 Consider the finite game space G[n;k1,...,kn]. The potential subspace is GP = im(BP ), and satisfies
that dim(GP ) = k +
∑n
i=1
k
ki
− 1.
By Theorem 4.6 and Proposition 2.3, BP (BP )† is the orthogonal projection onto GP . Later we will give
polynomial representation for BP (BP )†. This part is much more difficult than the case of nonstrategic games,
and we will finish it in next section. For a potential game V cG, using Eqn. (23), in next section we will also find
polynomial representation for its potential functions. Before proceeding it, we turn to the study of pure harmonic
games.
4.3 Subspaces of pure harmonic games
The following theorem follows from Theorem 4.6.
Theorem 4.7 Consider the finite game space G[n;k1,...,kn]. The pure harmonic subspace is H = im(BP )⊥, and
satisfies dim(H) = (n− 1)k −∑ni=1 kki + 1.
By Proposition 2.3, the following Proposition 4.8 holds.
Proposition 4.8 im(BP ) = im(BP (BP )†), im(BP )⊥ = ker((BP )T ) = im(Ink −BPB†P ).
Then from Theorem 4.7, Propositions 2.3 and 4.8, the following theorem follows.
Theorem 4.9
H =ker(1Tn ⊗ Ik) ∩ ker
(
1
k1
e1 ⊕ · · · ⊕
1
kn
en
)
= im
(
Ink −
1
n
(1n×n ⊗ Ik)
)
∩
im
((
Ik −
1
k1
e1
)
⊕ · · · ⊕
(
Ik −
1
kn
en
))
,
(25)
where e1, . . . , en are defined in (6).
From Theorem 4.9, Theorem 4.10 which follows shows a direct definition for pure harmonic games.
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Theorem 4.10 The pure harmonic games are exactly the games (N,S, c) in G[n;k1,...,kn] satisfying the following
two conditions
∀s ∈ S,
n∑
i=1
ci(s) = 0, (26)
∀i ∈ [1, n], ∀y ∈ S−i,
∑
x∈Si
ci(x, y) = 0. (27)
Proof We use Theorem 4.9 to prove it. Arbitrarily choose a game u = (u1, . . . , un)T ∈ G[n;k1,...,kn], where
each uTi belongs to Rk.
u ∈ ker(1Tn ⊗ Ik) iff,
∑n
i=1 u
T
i = 0 iff, (26) holds.
u ∈ ker
(
1
k1
e1 ⊕ · · · ⊕
1
kn
en
)
iff, for all i ∈ [1, n], eiuTi = EiETi uTi = 0 iff, for all i ∈ [1, n], uiEi = 0
iff, for all i ∈ [1, n], 0 = ui(Ik[1,i−1] ⊗ 1ki ⊗ Ik[i+1,n]) iff, for all i ∈ [1, n], all X ∈ ∆k[1,i−1] , all Y ∈ ∆k[i+1,n] ,
ui(X ⊗ 1ki ⊗ Y ) = ui(X ⋉ 1ki ⋉ Y ) = uiX(
∑
y∈∆ki
y)Y =
∑
y∈∆ki
uiXyY = 0 iff, (27) holds.
Note that finite games satisfying (27) are called normalized in [5], and the subspace of normalized games is the
orthogonal complement of the nonstrategic subspace.
[5, Proposition 5.1] shows that “Harmonic games generically do not have pure Nash equilibria.” Next we prove
a stronger result, i.e., the following Theorem 4.12. Note that the proofs of [5, Proposition 5.1] and the following
Theorem 4.12 are essentially different. The following Proposition 4.11 will be used in Theorem 4.12.
Proposition 4.11 Consider the finite game space G[n;k1,...,kn]. A pure harmonic game (N,S, c) ∈ H possesses a
pure Nash equilibrium s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s∗n) ∈ S iff for all i ∈ [1, n], all s ∈ Si, ci(s∗1, . . . , s∗i−1, s, s∗i+1, . . . , s∗n) = 0.
Proof The “if” part holds naturally. Next we prove the “only if” part.
From the definition of pure Nash equilibrium, for all i ∈ [1, n], all s ∈ Si, ci(s∗1, . . . , s∗i−1, s, s∗i+1, . . . , s∗n) ≤
ci(s
∗). Then from (27), for all i ∈ [1, n], 0 =∑t∈Si ci(s∗1, . . . ,
s∗i−1, t, s
∗
i+1, . . . , s
∗
n) ≤ kici(s
∗). From (26), for all i ∈ [1, n], ci(s∗) = 0. Then for all i ∈ [1, n], all s ∈ Si,
ci(s
∗
1, . . . , s
∗
i−1, s, s
∗
i+1, . . . , s
∗
n) ≤ 0. Again from (27), for all i ∈ [1, n], all s ∈ Si, ci(s∗1, . . . , s∗i−1, s, s∗i+1, . . . , s∗n) =
0.
Theorem 4.12 Pure harmonic games generically do not have pure Nash equilibria.
Proof Consider the finite game space G[n;k1,...,kn]. For each strategy profile s ∈ S, denote Gs ⊂ H by the
set of pure harmonic games that have s as a pure Nash equilibrium. By Proposition 4.11, for every two games
(N,S, c′), (N,S, c′′) both in Gs, (N,S, c′ − c′′) is also in Gs. Then for each s ∈ S, Gs is a subspace of H. Next
we prove for each s ∈ S, dim(Gs) < dim(H), then ∪s∈SGs is a measure 0 subset of H. That is, pure harmonic
games generically do not have pure Nash equilibria.
Without loss of generality, we assume that s = δ1k ∈ ∆k. Choose an arbitrary pure harmonic game uT =
(u1, . . . , un)
T ∈ H, where each uTi belongs to Rk. Then by Proposition 4.11, uT has a pure Nash equilibrium s
iff, for all i ∈ [1, n], all x ∈ ∆ki , 0 = uiδ1k[1,i−1]xδ
1
k[i+1,n]
= ui(δ
1
k[1,i−1]
⊗ x ⊗ δ1
k[i+1,n]
) iff, for all i ∈ [1, n],
0 = ui(δ
1
k[1,i−1]
⊗ Iki ⊗ δ
1
k[i+1,n]
). Then by Theorem 4.9,
Gδ1
k
= ker(Gδ1
k
), (28)
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where
Gδ1
k
:=


Ik · · · Ik
ET1
.
.
.
ETn
FT1
.
.
.
FTn


∈ R(k+
∑
k
i=1
k
ki
+
∑
n
i=1 ki)×(nk)
,
E1, . . . , En are defined in (6), FTi = (δ1k[1,i−1])T ⊗ Iki ⊗ (δ1k[i+1,n])T , i ∈ [1, n].
Note that each of the last
∑n
i=1 ki rows ofGδ1k correspondes to a game that is not potential. Then rank(Gδ1k ) >
rank(BP ) = dim(P ⊕N ). Hence dim(Gδ1
k
) = nk − rank(Gδ1
k
) < dim(H) = nk − dim(P ⊕ N ).
Theorem 4.12 naturally yields the following corollary.
Corollary 4.13 A pure harmonic game in G[2;2,2] has a pure Nash equilibrium iff it is trivial.
Proof For this case, for all s ∈ {1, 2} × {1, 2}, rank(Gs) = 8, then dim(Gs) = 8 − rank(Gs) = 0. That is,
the conclusion holds.
4.4 Subspaces of pure potential games
Define
PN :=


Ik −
1
k1
e1
.
.
.
Ik −
1
kn
en

 ∈ R(nk)×k, (29)
where e1, . . . , en are defined in (6).
It follows that
PTNBN = 0, (30)
[
PN , BN
]
= BP


Ik
− 1
k1
ET1 I k
k1
.
.
.
.
.
.
− 1
kn
ETn I k
kn

 , (31)
where BN is defined in (8), and E1, . . . , En are defined in (6).
In view of (30) and (31), the following theorem holds.
Theorem 4.14 Consider the finite game space G[n;k1,...,kn]. The pure potential subspace is P = im(PN ) =
im(PNP
†
N ), satisfies dim(P) = k − 1, and every k − 1 distinct columns of PN is a basis of P .
Proof Eqn. (30) implies that im(PN )⊥N . Eqn. (31) implies that im(PN ) ⊕ N = im(BP ) = GP . Then
im(PN ) = P , and dim(P) = dim(GP ) − dim(N ) = k − 1. Note that the sum of all columns of PN are the zero
vector of Rnk, then every distinct k − 1 vectors of PN is a basis of P .
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By Theorem 4.14, PN (PN )† is the orthogonal projection onto P . Next we give a direct definition for pure
potential games, i.e., the following Theorem 4.15. This theorem also shows that pure potential games are exactly
the potential games that are normalized.
Theorem 4.15 The pure potential games are exactly the games (N,S, c) in G[n;k1,...,kn] satisfying Eqns. (15) and
(27).
Proof The subspace consisting of games satisfying (15) are GP = P ⊕ N , and the subspace consisting of
games satisfying (27) are P ⊕H.
To prove this theorem, we only need to prove
(P ⊕N ) ∩ (P ⊕H) = P . (32)
(P ⊕N ) ∩ (P ⊕H) ⊃ P holds naturally. Next we prove (P ⊕N ) ∩ (P ⊕H) ⊂ P .
Arbitrarily given u ∈ (P ⊕ N ) ∩ (P ⊕H). Since u ∈ P ⊕ N , u = uP + uN , where uP ∈ P , uN ∈ N . On
the other hand, u ∈ P ⊕ H = N⊥, then 0 = BNB†Nu = BNB
†
NuP + BNB
†
NuN = 0 + uN . Hence u = uP .
That is, (P ⊕N ) ∩ (P ⊕H) ⊂ P .
4.5 Subspaces of harmonic games
Theorem 4.16 The harmonic games are exactly the games (N,S, c) in G[n;k1,...,kn] satisfying that
∀s ∈ S,
n∑
i=1
(
1
ki
∑
x∈Si
ci(x, s
−i)− ci(s)
)
= 0. (33)
The harmonic subspace is
GH = N ⊕H = ker
([
Ik −
1
k1
e1 · · · Ik −
1
kn
en
])
, (34)
and satisfies dim(GH) = (n− 1)k + 1.
Proof Theorem 4.14 directly yields that (34) holds, and dim(GH) = (n− 1)k + 1.
Arbitrarily choose a game u = (u1, . . . , un)T ∈ G[n;k1,...,kn], where each uTi belongs to Rk. For all X =
⋉nj=1Xj ∈ ∆k, where each Xj belongs to ∆kj , we denote X [1,i−1] := ⋉i−1j=1Xj , X [i+1,n] := ⋉nj=i+1Xj . Then u
14
satisfies (33) iff, for all X ∈ ∆k,
0 =
n∑
i=1

 1
ki
∑
z∈∆ki
uiX
[1,i−1]zX [i+1,n] − uiX


=
n∑
i=1

 1
ki
uiX
[1,i−1]

 ∑
z∈∆ki
z

X [i+1,n] − uiX


=
n∑
i=1
(
1
ki
uiX
[1,i−1] (1ki)X
[i+1,n] − uiX
)
=
n∑
i=1
(
1
ki
uiX
[1,i−1]
(
1ki1
T
ki
Xi
)
X [i+1,n] − uiX
)
=
n∑
i=1
(
1
ki
ui (Ik[1,i−1] ⊗ 1ki×ki)X − uiX
)
=
n∑
i=1
(
1
ki
ui (Ik[1,i−1] ⊗ 1ki×ki ⊗ Ik[i+1,n])X − uiX
)
=
n∑
i=1
(
1
ki
uiei − ui
)
X
(35)
iff, u ∈ ker
([
Ik −
1
k1
e1 · · · Ik −
1
kn
en
])
.
At the end of this subsection, we show that all harmonic games share a common mixed strategy Nash equilib-
rium — the uniformly mixed strategy profile.
Theorem 4.17 Every harmonic game has the uniformly mixed strategy profile as its mixed strategy Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof Arbitrarily given a harmonic game (N,S, c). Let the uniformly mixed strategy profile be x∗ =
(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈
∏n
i=1 ∆S
i
.
From Theorem 4.16, for all s ∈ S,
0 =
n∑
i=1
(
1
ki
∑
t∈Si
ci(t, s
−i)− ci(s)
)
=
1
kj
∑
t∈Sj
cj(t, s
−j)− cj(s)+
n∑
i=1,i6=j
(
1
ki
∑
t∈Si
ci(t, s
−i)− ci(s)
)
.
(36)
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Then for all players j ∈ N , all strategies r ∈ Sj ,
0 =
∑
s−j∈S−j
(
1
kj
∑
t∈Sj
cj(t, s
−j)− cj(r, s
−j)
)
+
∑
s−j∈S−j
n∑
i=1,i6=j
(
1
ki
∑
t∈Si
ci(t, s
−i)− ci(s)
)
=
1
kj
∑
s−j∈S−j
∑
t∈Sj
cj(t, s
−j)−
∑
s−j∈S−j
cj(r, s
−j)+
n∑
i=1,i6=j
(
1
ki
∑
s−j∈S−j
∑
t∈Si
ci(t, s
−i)−
∑
s−j∈S−j
ci(s)
)
=
1
kj
∑
s∈S
cj(s)−
∑
s−j∈S−j
cj(r, s
−j)+
n∑
i=1,i6=j
(
ki
ki
∑
s−j∈S−j
ci(s)−
∑
s−j∈S−j
ci(s)
)
=
1
kj
∑
s∈S
cj(s)−
∑
s−j∈S−j
cj(r, s
−j)
=
k
kj
(
1
k
∑
s∈S
cj(s)−
1
k
kj
∑
s−j∈S−j
cj(r, s
−j)
)
=
k
kj
(
cj(x
∗)− cj(r, (x
∗)−j)
)
.
(37)
Hence x∗ is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of game (N,S, c).
From Theorem 4.17 and [5, Theorem 5.5], it follows that these two different harmonic games have similar
properties.
4.6 Decomposition of subspaces of finite games
Theorem 4.18 Consider the finite game space G[n;k1,...,kn]. The pure potential subspace P , the nonstrategic
subspace N and the pure harmonic subspace H satisfy that
P = im(BPB
†
P −BNB
†
N ),
N = im(BNB
†
N ),
H = im(Ink −BPB
†
P ).
(38)
BPB
†
P − BNB
†
N , BNB
†
N , Ink − BPB
†
P are orthogonal projections onto these three subspaces. Under the con-
ventional inner product, P⊥N , P⊥H, N⊥H.
Every game u ∈ G[n;k1,...,kn] has a unique direct-sum decomposition u = uP+uN+uH, where uP ∈ P , uN ∈
N , uH ∈ H. Actually, uP = (BPB†P −BNB
†
N )u ∈ P , uN = BNB
†
Nu ∈ N , uH = (Ink −BPB
†
P )u ∈ H.
Proof By Theorems 4.4, 4.7 and Proposition 4.8, N = im(BNB†N ), H = im(Ink −BPB
†
P ).
By the definition of Moore-Penrose inverses, BNB†N and Ink − BPB
†
P are both orthogonal projections.
Since im(BP ) ⊃ im(BN ), from Proposition 2.7, BPB†PBNB
†
N = BNB
†
NBPB
†
P = BNB
†
N . Then (BPB
†
P −
16
BNB
†
N )
2 = (BPB
†
P−BNB
†
N ), i.e.,BPB
†
P−BNB
†
N is also an orthogonal projection. One also hasBNB†N (Ink−
BPB
†
P ) = (Ink − BPB
†
P )BNB
†
N = 0(nk)×(nk), BNB
†
N(BPB
†
P − BNB
†
N ) = (BPB
†
P − BNB
†
N )BNB
†
N =
(Ink − BPB
†
P )(BPB
†
P − BNB
†
N ) = (BPB
†
P − BNB
†
N )(Ink − BPB
†
P ) = 0(nk)×(nk). Hence im(BPB
†
P −
BNB
†
N ) = P , and P⊥N , P⊥H, N⊥H.
Arbitrarily given u ∈ G[n;k1,...,kn], it is obviously that u = (BPB
†
P −BNB
†
N )u+BNB
†
Nu+(Ink−BPB
†
P )u
is such a decomposition. Next we prove that the decomposition is unique. There are uP ∈ P , uN ∈ N and
uH ∈ H such that u = uP + uN + uH. From Eqn. (38),
(BPB
†
P −BNB
†
N )u
=(BPB
†
P −BNB
†
N )uP + (BPB
†
P −BNB
†
N )uN+
(BPB
†
P −BNB
†
N )uH
=uP + 0 + 0 = uP ,
BNB
†
Nu
=BNB
†
NuP +BNB
†
NuN +BNB
†
NuH
=0 + uN + 0 = uN ,
(Ink −BPB
†
P )u
=(Ink −BPB
†
P )uP + (Ink −BPB
†
P )uN+
(Ink −BPB
†
P )uH
=0 + 0 + uH = uH.
(39)
That is, the decomposition is unique.
From Proposition 2.1, Theorems 4.14 and 4.18, the following Proposition 4.19 follows.
Proposition 4.19
BPB
†
P = BNB
†
N + PNP
†
N . (40)
5 Polynomial representation for orthogonal projections onto subspaces of
finite games
In Section 4, polynomial representation for the orthogonal projection onto the nonstrategic subspace N , i.e.,(
1
k1
e1 ⊕ · · · ⊕
1
kn
en
)
, is given in Theorem 4.4. In the sequel, based on the results in Section 4, we give poly-
nomial representation for orthogonal projections onto all the other subspaces of finite games and for potential
functions of potential games. We start with the pure potential subspace.
5.1 Algorithms for calculating the orthogonal projections onto the pure potential sub-
space
By Propositions 2.3, 2.5, and Theorem 4.14, the following theorem holds.
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Theorem 5.1
P = im




Ik −
1
k1
e1
.
.
.
Ik −
1
kn
en



 =
im




Ik −
1
k1
e1
.
.
.
Ik −
1
kn
en




Ik −
1
k1
e1
.
.
.
Ik −
1
kn
en


†

 =
im




Ik −
1
k1
e1
.
.
.
Ik −
1
kn
en


(
n∑
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))♯ 
Ik −
1
k1
e1
.
.
.
Ik −
1
kn
en


T

 ,
(41)
where e1, . . . , en are defined in (6).
If we obtain the representation for
(∑n
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))♯
, we will obtain the polynomial representation for
the orthogonal projection onto P .
First we design an algorithm to calculate(∑n
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))♯
. The following proposition plays an important role in designing this algorithm.
Proposition 5.2 Consider the finite game space G[n;k1,...,kn]. eNs , Ns ⊂ [1, n] (defined in (16)) are linearly
independent.
Proof Let cNs ∈ R, Ns ⊂ [1, n], and
∑
Ns⊂[1,n]
cNseNs = 0.
First we consider the (1, k)-entry of eNs , Ns ⊂ [1, n]. It can be seen that e[1,n](1, k) = 1, and for all
Ns ( [1, n], eNs(1, k) = 0. Hence c[1,n] = 0. Remove e[1,n].
Second we consider the (1, k
k1
)-entry of eNs , Ns ( [1, n]. It can be seen that e[2,n](1, kki ) = 1, and for all
[2, n] 6= Ns ( [1, n], eNs(1,
k
ki
) = 0. Hence c[2,n] = 0. Remove e[2,n].
Similarly we have for all i ∈ [1, n], c[1,n]\{i} = 0. Remove eNs , |Ns| = n− 1.
Similarly for all Ns ⊂ [1, n] satisfying |Ns| = n− 2, cNs = 0. Remove eNs , |Ns| = n− 2.
Repeat this procedure again and again, and finally we have for all Ns ⊂ [1, n], cNs = 0.
Based on the above analysis, eNs , Ns ⊂ [1, n] are linearly independent.
By Propositions 2.4 and 5.2,
(∑n
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))♯
is in the form of
∑
Ns⊂[1,n]
cNseNs , where all coefficients
cNs belong to R and are unique. Let X =
∑
Ns⊂[1,n]
dNseNs , where dNs ∈ R are to be determined. Then(∑n
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))2
X is in the form of
∑
Ns⊂[1,n]
eNseNs , where eNs are polynomials of dNs , Ns ⊂ [1, n].
From Proposition 2.6, it follows that linear equation(
n∑
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))2 ∑
Ns⊂[1,n]
dNseNs

 =
n∑
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
) (42)
has solution.
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Algorithm 1 Find a solution {d0Ns |Ns ⊂ [1, n]} of Eqn. (42). From Proposition 2.6,
(∑n
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))♯
=(∑n
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))(∑
Ns⊂[1,n]
d0NseNs
)2
:=(∑
Ns⊂[1,n]
e0NseNs
)
.
By using Algorithm 1, for any givenn, one can obtain the polynomial representation for
(∑n
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))♯
.
Example 5.3 For n = 2: By using Algorithm 1, one has(
2∑
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))♯
=
1
2
Ik +
1
2
e1
k1
+
1
2
e2
k2
−
3
2
e1e2
k1k2
. (43)
Example 5.4 For n = 3: By using Algorithm 1, one has(
3∑
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))♯
=
1
3
Ik +
1
6
e1
k1
+
1
6
e2
k2
+
1
6
e3
k3
+
1
3
e1e2
k1k2
+
1
3
e1e3
k1k3
+
1
3
e2e3
k2k3
−
11
6
e1e2e3
k1k2k3
.
(44)
Second by observing the above specific examples, we obtain the polynomial representation for(∑n
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))♯
as a function of n and a linear combination of eNs , Ns ⊂ [1, n]. That is, one can directly
use Theorem 5.5 to calculate
(∑n
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))♯
. Note that Theorem 5.5 is a closed form, i.e., no matter
whether n is given, one knows the polynomial form of
(∑n
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))♯
. Such results cannot be found in
[15] or [5].
Theorem 5.5 Consider the finite game space G[n;k1,...,kn].(
n∑
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))♯
=
n−1∑
j=0
∑
1≤i1<···<ij≤n
1
(n− j)Cjn
j∏
l=1
eil
kil
−
(
n∑
i=1
1
i
)
n∏
i=1
ei
ki
,
(45)
where
∑
1≤i1<···<i0≤n
1
(n−0)C0n
∏0
l=1
eil
kil
= 1
n
Ik.
Proof Let X denote the right hand side of Eqn. (45). Since ∑ni=1 (Ik − 1ki ei) and X are both polynomials
of ei, i ∈ [1, n],
(∑n
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))
X = X
(∑n
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))
.
We claim that (
n∑
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))
X = Ik −
n∏
i=1
ei
ki
. (46)
It can be verified that the coefficient of Ik of the left hand side of Eqn. (46) is n · 1(n−0)C0n = 1.
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For all 1 ≤ j < n, and all 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < ij ≤ n, the terms
∏j
l=1
ekl
kil
only come from (nIk)
(
1
(n−j)Cjn
∏j
l=1
eil
kil
)
,(
−
∑n
i=1
(
1
ki
ei
))(
1
(n−j)Cjn
∏j
l=1
eil
kil
)
and
(
−
∑n
i=1
(
1
ki
ei
))
(∑
Ns⊂{i1,...,ij},|Ns|=j−1
1
(n−(j−1))Cj−1n
eNs∏
l∈Ns
kl
)
, and their coefficients are n
(n−j)Cjn
, − j
(n−j)Cjn
and
−
C
j−1
j
(n−(j−1))Cj−1n
, respectively. Then the coefficient of
∏j
l=1
ekl
kil
of the left hand side of Eqn. (46) is equal to
n
(n−j)Cjn
− j
(n−j)Cjn
−
C
j−1
j
(n−(j−1))Cj−1n
= 0.
The term
∏n
i=1
ei
ki
comes from
(∑n
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))
(∑n
i=1
1
i
)∏n
i=1
ei
ki
and
(
−
∑n
i=1
(
1
ki
ei
))
(∑
Ns⊂[1,n],|Ns|=n−1
1
(n−(n−1))Cn−1n
eNs∏
l∈Ns
kl
)
, and their coefficients are n
∑n
i=1
1
i
− n
∑n
i=1
1
i
= 0 and
− C
n−1
n
(n−(n−1))Cn−1n
= −1. Hence the coefficient of
∏n
i=1
ei
ki
of the left hand side of Eqn. (46) is equal to 0−1 = −1.
Based on these analysis, Eqn. (46) holds.
We also have (
n∑
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))(
Ik −
n∏
i=1
ei
ki
)
=nIk − n
n∏
i=1
ei
ki
−
n∑
i=1
ei
ki
+ n
n∏
i=1
ei
ki
=nIk −
n∑
i=1
ei
ki
,
(47)
and (
Ik −
n∏
i=1
ei
ki
)
X =
X −

n−1∑
j=0
Cjn
(n− j)Cjn
−
n∑
i=1
1
i

 n∏
i=1
ei
ki
= X.
(48)
From (46), (47), (48), and
(∑n
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))
X = X
(∑n
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))
,
X =
(
n∑
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))♯
. (49)
Remark 5.1 From Proposition 5.2, eNs , Ns ⊂ [1, n] are linearly independent, so the representation for(∑n
i=1
(
Ik −
1
ki
ei
))♯
shown in (45) cannot be simpler.
5.2 Polynomial representation for orthogonal projections onto subspaces of finite games
By Theorems 5.1 and 5.5, polynomial representation for orthogonal projections onto the subspaces of pure potential
games, nonstrategic games and pure harmonic games shown in Eqn. (38) are obtained as below.
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Theorem 5.6 Consider the finite game space G[n;k1,...,kn]. The polynomial representation for orthogonal pro-
jections onto the pure potential subspace P , the nonstrategic subspace N , the pure harmonic subspace H, the
potential subspace GP , the harmonic subspace GH are as below:
PNXP
T
N ,
(
1
k1
e1 ⊕ · · · ⊕
1
kn
en
)
,
Ink − PNXP
T
N −
(
1
k1
e1 ⊕ · · · ⊕
1
kn
en
)
,
PNXP
T
N +
(
1
k1
e1 ⊕ · · · ⊕
1
kn
en
)
,
Ink − PNXP
T
N ,
(50)
where PN is defined in (29), X is the right hand side of (45), and ei’s are defined in (6).
5.3 Polynomial representation for potential functions
In this subsection, we give polynomial representation for potential functions.
Theorem 5.7 Consider the finite game space G[n;k1,...,kn]. If a game G ∈ G[n;k1,...,kn] is potential, then the
structure matrix of its potential functions are the first k elements of

Ik
− 1
k1
ET1 I k
k1
.
.
.
.
.
.
− 1
kn
ETn I k
kn


[
P †N
B†N
]
G+ c1k+
∑
n
i=1
k
ki
, (51)
where c ∈ R is arbitrary, P †N = XPTN , PN is defined in (29), X is the right hand side of (45), B†N = ( 1k1ET1 ⊕
· · · ⊕ 1
kn
ETn ).
Proof In view of (23), in order to prove this theorem, we only need to prove
BP


Ik
− 1
k1
ET1 I k
k1
.
.
.
.
.
.
− 1
kn
ETn I k
kn


[
P †N
B†N
]
G = G.
By (31) and Theorem 4.19,
BP


Ik
− 1
k1
ET1 I k
k1
.
.
.
.
.
.
− 1
kn
ETn I k
kn


[
P †N
B†N
]
G
=
[
PN BN
] [P †N
B†N
]
G = (PNP
†
N +BNB
†
N )G
=BPB
†
PG = G.
(52)
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By Theorems 5.6 and 5.7, in order to testify whether a finite game belongs to one of the five subspaces described
in Theorem 5.6, one only needs to use the number n of players and those k1, . . . , kn of their strategies to calculate
the orthogonal projectionPπ onto them, where Pπ denotes the orthogonal projection onto one of the five subspaces.
Then game u ∈ G[n;k1,...,kn] belongs to the corresponding subspace iff Pπu = u. Furthermore, if u is potential,
one can use the orthogonal projection PGP onto the potential subspace to calculate its potential functions according
to Theorem 5.7.
Besides, although closed forms of the orthogonal projections onto the subspaces of 2-player finite games are
given in [5, Subsection 4.3], closed forms for the general case are not shown. In order to obtain the closed forms
of the orthogonal projections onto the subspaces of finite games shown in [5], one needs to find the closed forms
of δ†0 and D† in [5, Theorem 4.1], where δ0 =
∑M
i=1Di and D = [D∗1 , ..., D∗M ]∗, (·)∗ denotes the adjoint opertor
of ·, D1, ..., DM are corresponding linear operators. The closed form of D† is given in [5, Lemma 4.4], while the
closed form of δ†0 is not shown.
Next we give some illustrative examples to show the advantage of our results.
5.4 Illustrative examples
Example 5.8 [15] Consider an arbitrary symmetric game with n = 3 and k1 = k2 = k3 = 2. It is proved in [15]
that such symmetric games are always potential via proving that the corresponding potential equations always
have solution. Next we show how to use Theorem 5.6 to verify this conclusion. The process of [15] is constructive.
However our following process is mechanical, and can be finished by a computer program.
First we obtain the orthogonal projection onto the subspace of potential games GP according to Theorem 5.6
as in Eqn. (53).
Second, we verify whether such symmetric gamesG = [a, b, b, d, c, e, e, f, a, b, c, e, b, d, e, f, a, c, b, e, b, e, d, f ]
satisfy that PGPGT = GT . It is directly obtained that PGPGT = GT holds no matter what real numbers
a, b, c, d, e, f are. Hence such symmetric games are always potential.
Third, we obtain their potential functions according to Theorem 5.7 as P (x) = [(7a)/8 + b/2 − (7c)/8 +
d/8− e/2− f/8, b/2− a/8+ c/8+ d/8− e/2− f/8, b/2− a/8+ c/8+ d/8− e/2− f/8, c/8− b/2− a/8+
d/8+ e/2− f/8, b/2− a/8+ c/8+ d/8− e/2− f/8, c/8− b/2− a/8+ d/8 + e/2− f/8, c/8− b/2− a/8+
d/8+e/2−f/8, c/8− b/2−a/8− (7d)/8+e/2+(7f)/8]x+ c0, where x = ⋉3i=1xi ∈ ∆8, c0 ∈ R is arbitrary.
If we choose a = 1, b = 1, c = 2, d = −1, e = 1, f = −1, and c0 = −9/8, we obtain the following potential
function P (x) = [−2,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1]x, which is the same as the one obtained in [15].
Now it is known that every symmetric game with three players and two strategies is potential. Then is every
finite symmetric game potential? Next we give a negative answer.
Example 5.9 Consider symmetric games with n = 2 and k1 = k2 = 3, i.e., G = [a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, a, d, g, b,
e, h, c, f, i], where a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i ∈ R are arbitrary. By using Theorem 5.6, the orthogonal projection onto
the potential subspace is calculated in Eqn. (54). Such games are potential iff, PGPGT = GT iff, c− b+ d− f −
g + h = 0.
Besides, by Theorem 5.6, such games are pure harmonic iff, (I18 − PGP )GT = GT iff, a = e = i = 0 and
b = g = −c = −d = −h = f .
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PGP =
1
48


38, 4, 4, 2, 10,−4,−4,−2, 5, 1,−5,−1,−5,−1, 5, 1, 5,−5, 1,−1,−5, 5,−1, 1
4, 38, 2, 4,−4, 10,−2,−4, 1, 5,−1,−5,−1,−5, 1, 5,−5, 5,−1, 1, 5,−5, 1,−1
4, 2, 38, 4,−4,−2, 10,−4,−5,−1, 5, 1, 5, 1,−5,−1, 1,−1, 5,−5,−1, 1,−5, 5
2, 4, 4, 38,−2,−4,−4, 10,−1,−5, 1, 5, 1, 5,−1,−5,−1, 1,−5, 5, 1,−1, 5,−5
10,−4,−4,−2, 38, 4, 4, 2,−5,−1, 5, 1, 5, 1,−5,−1,−5, 5,−1, 1, 5,−5, 1,−1
−4, 10,−2,−4, 4, 38, 2, 4,−1,−5, 1, 5, 1, 5,−1,−5, 5,−5, 1,−1,−5, 5,−1, 1
−4,−2, 10,−4, 4, 2, 38, 4, 5, 1,−5,−1,−5,−1, 5, 1,−1, 1,−5, 5, 1,−1, 5,−5
−2,−4,−4, 10, 2, 4, 4, 38, 1, 5,−1,−5,−1,−5, 1, 5, 1,−1, 5,−5,−1, 1,−5, 5
5, 1,−5,−1,−5,−1, 5, 1, 38, 4, 10,−4, 4, 2,−4,−2, 5,−5,−5, 5, 1,−1,−1, 1
1, 5,−1,−5,−1,−5, 1, 5, 4, 38,−4, 10, 2, 4,−2,−4,−5, 5, 5,−5,−1, 1, 1,−1
−5,−1, 5, 1, 5, 1,−5,−1, 10,−4, 38, 4,−4,−2, 4, 2,−5, 5, 5,−5,−1, 1, 1,−1
−1,−5, 1, 5, 1, 5,−1,−5,−4, 10, 4, 38,−2,−4, 2, 4, 5,−5,−5, 5, 1,−1,−1, 1
−5,−1, 5, 1, 5, 1,−5,−1, 4, 2,−4,−2, 38, 4, 10,−4, 1,−1,−1, 1, 5,−5,−5, 5
−1,−5, 1, 5, 1, 5,−1,−5, 2, 4,−2,−4, 4, 38,−4, 10,−1, 1, 1,−1,−5, 5, 5,−5
5, 1,−5,−1,−5,−1, 5, 1,−4,−2, 4, 2, 10,−4, 38, 4,−1, 1, 1,−1,−5, 5, 5,−5
1, 5,−1,−5,−1,−5, 1, 5,−2,−4, 2, 4,−4, 10, 4, 38, 1,−1,−1, 1, 5,−5,−5, 5
5,−5, 1,−1,−5, 5,−1, 1, 5,−5,−5, 5, 1,−1,−1, 1, 38, 10, 4,−4, 4,−4, 2,−2
−5, 5,−1, 1, 5,−5, 1,−1,−5, 5, 5,−5,−1, 1, 1,−1, 10, 38,−4, 4,−4, 4,−2, 2
1,−1, 5,−5,−1, 1,−5, 5,−5, 5, 5,−5,−1, 1, 1,−1, 4,−4, 38, 10, 2,−2, 4,−4
−1, 1,−5, 5, 1,−1, 5,−5, 5,−5,−5, 5, 1,−1,−1, 1,−4, 4, 10, 38,−2, 2,−4, 4
−5, 5,−1, 1, 5,−5, 1,−1, 1,−1,−1, 1, 5,−5,−5, 5, 4,−4, 2,−2, 38, 10, 4,−4
5,−5, 1,−1,−5, 5,−1, 1,−1, 1, 1,−1,−5, 5, 5,−5,−4, 4,−2, 2, 10, 38,−4, 4
−1, 1,−5, 5, 1,−1, 5,−5,−1, 1, 1,−1,−5, 5, 5,−5, 2,−2, 4,−4, 4,−4, 38, 10
1,−1, 5,−5,−1, 1,−5, 5, 1,−1,−1, 1, 5,−5,−5, 5,−2, 2,−4, 4,−4, 4, 10, 38


(53)
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PGP =
1
18


14, 2, 2, 2,−1,−1, 2,−1,−1, 4,−2,−2,−2, 1, 1,−2, 1, 1
2, 14, 2,−1, 2,−1,−1, 2,−1,−2, 4,−2, 1,−2, 1, 1,−2, 1
2, 2, 14,−1,−1, 2,−1,−1, 2,−2,−2, 4, 1, 1,−2, 1, 1,−2
2,−1,−1, 14, 2, 2, 2,−1,−1,−2, 1, 1, 4,−2,−2,−2, 1, 1
−1, 2,−1, 2, 14, 2,−1, 2,−1, 1,−2, 1,−2, 4,−2, 1,−2, 1
−1,−1, 2, 2, 2, 14,−1,−1, 2, 1, 1,−2,−2,−2, 4, 1, 1,−2
2,−1,−1, 2,−1,−1, 14, 2, 2,−2, 1, 1,−2, 1, 1, 4,−2,−2
−1, 2,−1,−1, 2,−1, 2, 14, 2, 1,−2, 1, 1,−2, 1,−2, 4,−2
−1,−1, 2,−1,−1, 2, 2, 2, 14, 1, 1,−2, 1, 1,−2,−2,−2, 4
4,−2,−2,−2, 1, 1,−2, 1, 1, 14, 2, 2, 2,−1,−1, 2,−1,−1
−2, 4,−2, 1,−2, 1, 1,−2, 1, 2, 14, 2,−1, 2,−1,−1, 2,−1
−2,−2, 4, 1, 1,−2, 1, 1,−2, 2, 2, 14,−1,−1, 2,−1,−1, 2
−2, 1, 1, 4,−2,−2,−2, 1, 1, 2,−1,−1, 14, 2, 2, 2,−1,−1
1,−2, 1,−2, 4,−2, 1,−2, 1,−1, 2,−1, 2, 14, 2,−1, 2,−1
1, 1,−2,−2,−2, 4, 1, 1,−2,−1,−1, 2, 2, 2, 14,−1,−1, 2
−2, 1, 1,−2, 1, 1, 4,−2,−2, 2,−1,−1, 2,−1,−1, 14, 2, 2
1,−2, 1, 1,−2, 1,−2, 4,−2,−1, 2,−1,−1, 2,−1, 2, 14, 2
1, 1,−2, 1, 1,−2,−2,−2, 4,−1,−1, 2,−1,−1, 2, 2, 2, 14


(54)
Example 5.10 From the orthogonal projection PGP in Example 5.4, it follows that the Rock-Paper-Scissors game
G = [0,−1, 1, 1, 0,−1,−1, 1, 0, 0, 1,−1,−1, 0, 1, 1,
− 1, 0] satisfies that PGPGT = 0, hence this game is pure harmonic. [15, Example 27] shows that this game is not
potential. Note that for this game, n = 2, k1 = k2 = 3, so the pure harmonic game and the pure harmonic game
studied in [5] are the same. [5, Example 4.1] also shows that this game is pure harmonic.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have given complete characterization for how to project a finite game onto the subspaces of pure
potential games, nonstrategic games, pure harmonic games, potential games and harmonic games, respectively.
Based on this, one can easily verify whether a finite game belongs to one of these subspaces.
From Theorem 5.7, no matter a finite game is potential, one can obtain a function from the set of strategy
profiles to the reals. Then for a general finite game, what is the meaning of such a function? This interesting
problem is left for further study.
Not like potential games, harmonic games are young games. The results of this paper may provide an effective
way to the further study on theory and potential applications of harmonic games.
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